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
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EDUCATIONAL HETEROGAMY AND THE DIVISION OF PAID LABOUR IN THE FAMILY: A COMPARISON OF PRESENT-DAY BELGIUM AND SWEDEN

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RELATIVE FEMALE LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION

1. What is the role of the educational composition of the couple for relative female labour market participation?
 - Specialization hypothesis (cf. specialization theory, bargaining theory)
 - Gender Identity hypothesis (cf. gender identity theory)
2. What is the role of the presence of (young) children for relative female labour market participation?
 - Direct Child Effect hypothesis
 - Indirect Child Effect hypothesis



BELGIUM VS. SWEDEN

Belgium

Conservative welfare state
→ Male breadwinner model

Sweden

Social democratic welfare state
→ Dual-earner family



Educational composition?

- Specialization hypothesis BE < SE
- Gender Identity hypothesis BE > SE

The presence of (young) children?

- Direct Child Effect hypothesis BE < SE
- Indirect Child Effect hypothesis BE < SE



DATA

- EU-SILC 2004-2008
- Pooled cross-sectional data
- 2,592 Belgian and 3,348 Swedish couples:
 - Never-married (cohabiting) or married
 - Both partners born in BE/SE
 - Between 25-65 years old
 - Two adult household
 - Not: disabled, student, unpaid work
- Variables:

	%/means	
	BE	SE
Control variables		
Age of man	44.3	45.5
Age of man squared	2072.6	2197.6
Age of woman	42.3	43.4
Age of woman squared	1896.9	2006.5
Degree of urbanization		
<i>Densely populated</i>	46.8	17.9
<i>Intermediate</i>	48.5	13.8
<i>Thinly populated</i>	4.6	68.3

	%/means	
	BE	SE
Independent variables		
Man's education		
<i>Primary</i>	7.0	5.6
<i>Lower secondary</i>	14.7	9.3
<i>(Upper) secondary</i>	36.5	47.7
<i>Post-secondary, non-tertiary</i>	3.4	8.3
<i>Tertiary</i>	38.4	29.1
Woman's education		
<i>Primary</i>	8.5	2.6
<i>Lower secondary</i>	12.9	5.7
<i>(Upper) secondary</i>	32.7	47.0
<i>Post-secondary, non-tertiary</i>	2.4	4.8
<i>Tertiary</i>	43.4	40.0
Educational heterogamy	-0.1	-0.3
Presence of (young) children		
<i>No dependent children</i>	42.3	43.8
<i>Youngest child 6-18 years</i>	32.1	29.8
<i>Youngest child <6 years</i>	25.2	26.3
Dependent variables		
Woman's share of couple working hours		
<i>0%</i>	18.3	8.6
<i>1-40%</i>	24.4	16.0
<i>41-59%</i>	37.5	63.8
<i>≥60%</i>	6.9	8.0



DIAGONAL REFERENCE MODELS

$$Y_{ijk} = p * \mu_{ii} + (1-p) * \mu_{jj} + \underbrace{\sum \beta_l * H_{ijl}}_{\text{Control variables}} + \underbrace{\sum \beta_c * X_{ijc}}_{\text{Presence of (young) children}} + \underbrace{\sum \beta_h * H_{ijh}}_{\text{Educational heterogamy}} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

$0 \leq p \leq 1$
 $i = 1, \dots, T$
 $j = 1, \dots, T$
 $k = 1, \dots, n_{ij}$

		Education woman				
Education man		1	2	3	4	5
1		μ_{11}				
2			μ_{22}			
3				μ_{33}		
4					μ_{44}	
5						μ_{55}

→ Multinomial logistic DRMs



RESULTS –

MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC DIAGONAL REFERENCE MODELS

1. Baseline Model + Control Variables

2. + Presence of (Young) Children
+ Educational Heterogamy

$$Y_{ijk} = p * \mu_{ii} + (1-p) * \mu_{jj} + \sum \theta_l * X_{ijl} + \sum \theta_c * X_{ijc} + \sum \theta_h * H_{ijh} + \epsilon_{ijk}$$



RESULTS 1 – BASELINE MODEL + CV

	Belgium				Sweden			
	Salience Parameter p							
	0.033				0.216			
	Odds for the Homogamous with Educational Level i (Probability Between Brackets)							
	0%	1-40%	41-59%	>59%	0%	1-40%	41-59%	>59%
μ_{11}	1.269 (36.6%)	0.454 * (13.1%)	1 (28.9%)	0.742 (21.4%)	2.661 * (61.3%)	0.550 (12.7%)	1 (23.0%)	0.130 * (3.0%)
μ_{22}	0.576 (28.7%)	0.212 * (10.6%)	1 (49.8%)	0.221 * (11.0%)	0.557 (29.0%)	0.223 * (11.6%)	1 (52.2%)	0.138 * (7.2%)
μ_{33}	0.309 * (17.8%)	0.135 * (13.8%)	1 (57.7%)	0.198 * (11.4%)	0.515 * (28.7%)	0.135 * (10.1%)	1 (55.7%)	0.097 * (5.4%)
μ_{44}	0.701 (25.9%)	0.272 * (10.0%)	1 (36.9%)	0.737 (27.2%)	0.460 (27.9%)	0.122 * (7.4%)	1 (60.7%)	0.066 * (4.0%)
μ_{55}	0.142 * (9.3%)	0.213 * (14.1%)	1 (65.9%)	0.162 * (10.7%)	0.273 * (18.4%)	0.118 * (7.9%)	1 (67.2%)	0.097 * (6.5%)
$b_{age\ woman}$	0.896 * (25.9%)	1.032 (10.0%)	1 (36.9%)	0.981 (27.2%)	0.790 * (27.9%)	0.999 (7.4%)	1 (60.7%)	0.936 (4.0%)
$b_{age\ woman\ squared}$	1.004 * (25.9%)	0.999 (10.0%)	1 (36.9%)	0.999 (27.2%)	1.006 * (27.9%)	1.000 (7.4%)	1 (60.7%)	1.000 (4.0%)
$b_{age\ man}$	1.057 (25.9%)	1.076 (10.0%)	1 (36.9%)	0.866 * (27.2%)	1.057 (27.9%)	1.021 (7.4%)	1 (60.7%)	0.895 (4.0%)
$b_{age\ man\ squared}$	1.000 (25.9%)	0.999 (10.0%)	1 (36.9%)	1.007 * (27.2%)	0.998 (27.9%)	0.999 (7.4%)	1 (60.7%)	1.005 * (4.0%)
$b_{intermediate\ populated}$	1.219 (25.9%)	1.144 (10.0%)	1 (36.9%)	1.001 (27.2%)	0.859 (27.9%)	1.142 (7.4%)	1 (60.7%)	1.325 (4.0%)
$b_{thinly\ populated}$	1.315 (25.9%)	1.645 * (10.0%)	1 (36.9%)	0.729 (27.2%)	0.926 (27.9%)	1.469 * (7.4%)	1 (60.7%)	1.396 (4.0%)
N	2,254				3,224			

$*p < .05$

* $p < .05$.

RESULTS 2 – BASELINE MODEL + CV + PRESENCE OF (YOUNG) CHILDREN + EDUCATIONAL HETEROGAMY

	Odds for the Presence of (Young) Children and Educational Heterogamy							
	Belgium				Sweden			
	0%	1-40%	41-59%	>59%	0%	1-40%	41-59%	>59%
$b_{\text{youngest child } 6-18y}$	2.481 *	1.740 *	1	1.064	2.143 *	1.653 *	1	1.566 *
$b_{\text{youngest child } <6y}$	3.858 *	2.540 *	1	1.660	9.929 *	1.868 *	1	2.179 *
$b_{\text{educ. heterogamy}}$	1.014	0.993	1	0.888	1.392 *	1.184	1	1.000
N	2,254				3,224			

* $p < .05$.

Educational Heterogamy

BE: No significant effects

SE: Specialization hypothesis, BUT limited to 0% vs. 41-59%

Presence of (Young) Children

BE: (Young) children = higher odds of working 0% and 1-40%

SE: (Young) children = higher odds of working 0%, 1-40%, and >59%

Interaction

BE: No interaction effect

SE: Woman without dependent children >> Woman with children <6y

CONCLUSION

Female labour market participation

BE

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Education woman

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SE

Presence of (young) children

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Educational heterogamy

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- More egalitarianism and family-friendliness in **SE**
- Stronger effect of age and education in **BE**
- Small effect of educational heterogamy **overall (!)**



THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!



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